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Abstract 
This case note considers the rule of law implications of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ decision in Gillan and Quinton v UK (App no 4158/05, 12 Jan 2010, nyr) involving 
the UK’s stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000. 
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The UK’s terrorist legislation has been produced at a frenetic pace over the past decade. 
Almost equally as frenetic as the pace of production have been challenges taken against anti-
terror measures on a variety of grounds, none more so than for violating the European 
Convention of Human Rights incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1998, reflecting the 
ambivalent attitude to human rights of the previous Labour government. The cornerstone of 
the anti-terrorism regime, the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA) has proved particularly controversial, 
none more so than its capacious definitions of terrorist offences.1 Among its many provisions, 
it provides sweeping police powers of stop and search contained in ss. 44 to 47 of the Act 
which entail three distinct stages. Firstly, under section 44 TA, the powers themselves are 
created by specific authorisation by an officer of no lower than the rank of assistant chief 
inspector for a fixed period of time not exceeding 28 days and are limited to a specific 
geographic area.2 The effect of these prima facie limitations is somewhat weakened by the 
fact that the threshold for the invocation of the powers is set rather low, requiring that such 
powers be considered merely ‘expedient’3 rather than ‘necessary’ for the prevention of acts of 
terrorism. Once the power has been specifically authorised, it is subject to confirmation by 
the Secretary of State who must be informed as soon as the power is authorised.4 If the 
Secretary of State does not confirm the creation of the exceptional powers then they 
automatically expire within 48 hours.5 Finally, the third stage relates to the execution of the 
stop and search powers at the ‘coalface’ as it were, that is their exercise by individual 
officers. S. 44 permits a constable in uniform to stop and search any vehicle, driver or 
pedestrian whatsoever within a designated area and period for the purposes of searching for 
articles of a kind which could be connected with terrorism.6 Moreover, and most 
controversially, there is no requirement that the constable have a reasonable suspicion that 
the individual being searched actually is carrying any such prohibited article.7 A failure to 
stop and search when requested and/or the wilful obstruction of an officer undertaking a 
search incurs a potential fine and imprisonment.8 The conditions of the exercise of stop and 
search powers in England and Wales are supplemented by the provisions of Code A of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For discussion, see H Fenwick Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge, 2007), Chapter 14. 
2 S. 44(4)(a) TA. 
3 S. 44(3) TA. 
4 S. 46(3) TA. 
5 S. 46(4) TA. 
6 S. 44(1) and (2) TA. 
7 S. 45(1)(b) TA. 
8 S. 47(1) TA. 
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Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which set out guidelines with respect to the 
execution of the stop and search powers.9  
 In August 2003, the Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police created stop 
and search powers with a s. 44 authorisation to apply to the entire Metropolitan Police 
District for the maximum period possible under the act (28 days) which was duly confirmed 
by the Secretary of State.10 It was pursuant to this authorisation that both Gillan and Quinton 
were stopped and searched on 9 Sept 2003. Mr Gillan, a PhD student, was riding a bicycle on 
his way to a protest against an arms fair being held in early September 2003 in the Excel 
Centre in London’s Docklands. He was stopped by two police officers who, exercising their 
stop and search powers under the TA, searched his person and his rucksack before sending 
him on his way. He was detained for approximately 20 minutes. Ms Quinton was a freelance 
journalist who was in the vicinity of the protest in order to produce a documentary. She was 
stopped and searched by a police officer notwithstanding her explanation of her presence in 
the area and the production of her press pass. Again, the entire ordeal lasted no longer than 30 
minutes. Seven years after these brief and relatively modest intrusions into the daily lives of 
these two individuals, and after a unanimous dismissal of their claim at three instances in the 
UK—before the Divisional Court,11 the Court of Appeal12 and the House of Lords13—the 
European Court of Human Rights (the Court or ECtHR) declared the powers in accordance 
with which they were detained and searched to constitute a violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in Gillan and Quinton v The United Kingdom.14  
 The Court, having extensively reviewed the legislation and judgments prior to the 
hearing as well as considering Lord Carlile’s mounting exasperation with the exercise of the 
powers in practice in his annual reports,15 first considered the question of whether the powers 
could be considered to be a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR, something which 
was dismissed by the Lords on the grounds of the brevity of the search and that fact that it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Code A paragraphs 1.2, 1.3 and 2.19 to 2.23. 
10 As the ECtHR noted in the Gillan case, the purportedly exceptional stop and search powers have become a 
permanent feature of the policing of the London area given that the authorisations have been made on a 
continuous ‘rolling’ basis since ss. 44–47 TA came into force on 19 Feb 2001. See Gillan para. 34. 
11 [2003] EWHC 2545 (Admin) 
12 [2004] EWCA Civ 1067. 
13 [2006] 2 AC 307. Not one judge dissented in any of the decisions during the domestic proceedings. 
14 Gillan and Quinton v UK (App No 4158/05, Judgment of 12 January 2010). 
15 See para. 43 of the judgment. 
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took place in situ.16 The question of what precisely constitutes a deprivation of liberty as 
opposed to a restriction on the freedom of movement or a restriction of liberty is a complex 
one, exacerbated by the fact that its determination tends to be very case-sensitive. The 
ECtHR in Gillan took an expansive view of the application of Article 5. Somewhat 
surprisingly relying on a case from 2008, where the facts were arguably radically different,17 
the ECHR found that the element of compulsion implicit in the stop and search powers was 
central to the question of whether a deprivation had occurred and entertained the possibility 
that the s. 44 and 45 TA powers could engage Article 5.18 However, it found that it did not 
have to settle the question definitively in the light of its findings of a violation of Article 8, 
the right to privacy.  
On the question of whether the applicants’ right to privacy had been infringed by the 
ss. 44/45 powers, the Court resolved the ambiguity which influenced the Lords’ 
determination of the issue by finding that a search of the type envisaged by the TA entailing 
coercive powers to force an individual to submit to a search was, notwithstanding its brevity, 
a prima facie violation of the right to privacy which required justification.19 The court was 
unconvinced by the Lords’ analogy with searches at airports and upon entering buildings, 
highlighting the consensual element of the latter and the fact that, under the TA, ‘[t]he 
individual can be stopped anywhere and at any time, without notice and without any choice 
as to whether or not to submit to a search.’20  
As a prima facie violation of the right to privacy under Article 8, the Court went on to 
find that the restrictions on privacy implicit in ss. 44/45 could not be justified as being ‘in 
accordance with the law’ as required by Article 8(2). For the Court, the stop and search 
regime contained inadequate safeguards to prevent against the arbitrary exercise of the 
powers. There were two aspects of the stop and search scheme, in particular which concerned 
the Court.  
Firstly, it considered the question of the ground of ‘expediency in the fight against 
terrorism’ as insufficient justification for the creation of these draconian powers as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See in particular, Lord Bingham for the majority, above n 13, paras. 25 and 28. 
17 Foka v Turkey (App No 28940/95, Judgment of 24 June 2008). The circumstances of this case involved the 
apprehension and detention in police custody of a Greek Cypriot by the Turkish Cypriot authorities at a border 
crossing on the island and included allegations of mistreatment and police brutality. 
18 Gillan, para. 57. 
19 Gillan, paras. 61 and 63. 
20 Gillan para. 64. 
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‘expediency’ was not of the same magnitude as ‘necessity’ and thus a decision to create the 
powers lack any consideration of the proportionality of the authorisation.21 However, the crux 
of the Court’s finding of a violation of the Convention in this case was the fact that there 
were inadequate legal safeguards against abuse of the powers by individual officers which 
was mainly attributable to the absence of a reasonable suspicion requirement.22 Thus, the 
Court concluded, the provisions therefore violated Article 8(2) ECHR as not being ‘in 
accordance with the law’. 
Analysis 
The central issue in this decision was the interpretation of the requirements of the rule of law 
with respect to the restriction of rights under the convention. The ECHR permits restrictions 
on several of the rights protected on grounds of public policy provided such measures satisfy 
the requirements of legality and proportionality, the failure to satisfy the former being the 
cause of the violation in Gillan.23 The Court has, over the years, developed the conditions of 
legality under the convention based on the ideal of non-arbitrariness in the exercise of public 
powers.24 What is clear with respect to the legality requirement under the ECHR from Gillan 
is that it contains both a formal and a substantive aspect. The formal aspect, which was 
widely considered by the Lords, requires that the rights restricting measure be framed in 
terms which are sufficiently clear and precise so as to ‘enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct … to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail’,25 a classic formal conception of the rule of law.26 Thus, to 
ensure certainty in the conduct of public authorities, where domestic law confers discretion 
on the executive, it must ‘indicate the scope of any such discretion … and the manner of its 
exercise with sufficient clarity.’27  
 However, in Gillan the court made clear that the requirement of legality under the 
Convention also entails a substantive element, relating to the effective fettering of public 
power. In this regard, even precise and clear measures which regulate executive discretion 
will not satisfy the requirement of legality under the Convention where such discretion is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Gillan, para. 80. 
22 This is clearly stipulated in s. 45(1)(b) TA. 
23 See Articles 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8–11 ECHR. 
24 Malone v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 14, para 67. 
25 Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245, para 49. 
26 See B Tamanaha On the Rule of law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, 2005), Chapter 7. 
27 Malone, para. 68. 
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sufficiently limited in practice.28 With regard to the TA’s stop and search powers, it was the 
absenve of a requirement of reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officer that a driver 
or pedestrian was harbouring prohibited articles which failed the substantive legality 
requirement.29  
The requirement that an officer have a reasonable suspicion that an offence is being 
committed is an important safeguard in police powers of arrest. As Lord Diplock noted in the 
English case of Mohammed-Holgate v Duke, the reasonable suspicion requirement reflects 
the comprise between the rival public goods of individual liberty and the effective 
investigation and prosecution of crime.30 Moreover, its importance in providing a substantive 
curb on police discretion was highlighted in the leading decision on arrest of O’Hara v Chief 
Constable of the RUC.31 In this case, Lord Steyn emphasized the role of the reasonable 
suspicion requirement in holding individual officers to account by requiring a justification of 
the exercise of their powers in any individual case, an important fetter of police discretion 
which resonates beyond the law of arrest. Thus: 
The arrest can only be justified if the constable arresting the alleged suspect 
has reasonable grounds to suspect him to be guilty of an arrestable offence. 
The arresting officer is held accountable. That is the compromise between the 
values of individual liberty and public order.32 
The requirements of justification and accountability are important substantive 
safeguards against arbitrariness because they require both that an officer actually entertained 
a suspicion and that such a suspicion can be objectively justified, necessarily involving an ex 
post review of the police officer’s actions.33 The former requirement ensures that powers are 
exercised for the requisite purpose for which they are created and not any other, whereas the 
latter requirement upholds the accountability of individual officers by ensuring an ex post 
review of their actions on objectively justifiable grounds to ensure that they were not 
exercised arbitrarily. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Gillan, para. 87. 
29 Gillan, para 83. 
30 [1984] AC 437. 
31 O’Hara v Chief Constable of the RUC [1997] ELR 1; [1007] 1 All ER 129. This decision was challenged, 
unsuccessfully, before the ECtHR, O’Hara v UK (2002) 24 EHRR 812. 
32 Lord Steyn in O’Hara (HL) at 291 (emphasis added). 
33 Lord Hope in O’Hara (HL) at 298. 
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 Even though these cases concern police powers of arrest, the principle of non-
arbitrariness in the exercise of police powers of which they are an expression apply to police 
powers generally, as removing the requirement that an officer have a suspicion of an offence 
being committed removes any practical limit on individual discretion. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the stop and search powers in the TA contain limitations such as that the search must 
be effected with the exclusive purpose of ascertaining whether an individual is carrying 
prohibited items,34 and the Code A Guidance in England and Wales, what the Lords failed to 
appreciate was that in the absence of any accountability mechanism such as the reasonable 
suspicion requirement, such safeguards are completely ineffective. The effect of the provision 
is that every single search undertaken by an officer in an authorised area, whether actually 
taken for purposes of s. 45(1)(a) or not, is ipso facto lawful given that the decision as to 
whether a search should be effected and for the correct purpose is completely subjective, the 
officer both making the decision to search and reviewing it his or her own mind. This, as the 
ECtHR noted, leaves an unacceptably high level of discretion to individual officers which 
offends the substantive requirements of the rule of law.  
The Lords, in this case, showed an alarming willingness to uphold the legality of the 
stop and search measures at all costs. Whereas the requirements of legality under the 
Convention were clearly articulated both in formal and substantive terms by the House, they 
were not followed through to their logical conclusion. Moreover, the Lords endorsed the 
sacrifice of human rights at the altar of security by emphasising the difficulties the police face 
in fighting terrorism, thereby skewing the delicate balance between liberty and security, 
carefully calibrated over the years through the reasonable suspicion requirement, in favour of 
enhanced police discretion.35 Moreover, the Lords’ confidence in the ability of individual 
officers to flawlessly exercise their powers presupposes a police force packed with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 S. 45(1)(a) TA. These requirements are elaborated in para. 3.8 Code A of PACE. Lord Bingham enumerated 
eleven safeguards in the stop and search regime which, the Court concluded, were a sufficient curb on the 
powers, at para. 14. 
35 For example, Lord Bingham found that the lack of reasonable suspicion requirements was ‘to ensure that a 
constable is not deterred from stopping and searching a person whom he does suspect as a potential terrorist by 
the fear that he could not show reasonable grounds for this suspicion’, regardless, it seems, of how civil liberties 
or individual rights are affect by this (para. 35). Perhaps more worryingly, having clearly summarised the 
serious problems with the lack of any objective criteria to justify the exercise of the powers as argued by 
Bainder Singh for the applicants, Lord Brown explicitly acknowledged and endorsed the arbitrary nature of the 
powers by highlighting the deterrent effect the random deployment of the powers would have on potential 
terrorists (para. 76). 
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policing equivalent of Dworkin’s mythical Judge Hercules.36 Without wishing to question the 
competence or the commitment of the security forces, they are only human, and may, at 
times, act out of boredom, stupidity or even more sinister motives including bigotry and 
racism,37 which could not be controlled or scrutinised under the TA’s stop and search regime. 
 This judicial deference in terrorism issues is becoming something of a habit since the 
high water mark of judicial independence in Belmarsh,38 which must be reversed if one of the 
central of objectives of the Human Rights Act—the resolution of human rights infringements 
‘at home’ rather than in Strasbourg39—is to be achieved; something which clearly failed in 
the Gillan case. Otherwise, Ewing’s thesis of the futility of the Human Rights Act seems an 
increasingly attractive proposition.40 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Dworkin’s device of the ‘ideal type’ Judge Hercules to illustrate his theory of law as integrity is well known. 
Hercules is an ‘imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power and patience’. R Dworkin Law’s Empire 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1986), 239. 
37 The issue of the potential for the abuse of these powers against ethnic minorities, particularly of Asian 
extraction, was broadly considered by Lord Brown, however, he concluded that the question of discrimination 
was not relevant to the circumstances in Gillan (para. 92). 
38 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68. See Ewing and Tham ‘The 
Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act’ (2008) Public Law 668–693. 
39 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, October 1997, para 1.14. 
40 Ewing ‘The Futility of the Human Rights Act’ (2004) Public Law 829 and Ewing and Tham, above, n. 38.  
